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No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention
above all to the education of youth, or that the neglect of educa-
tion does harm to states. The citizen should be moulded to suit
the form of government under which he lives. For each govern-
ment has a peculiar character which originally formed and which
continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates de-
mocracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and
always the better the character, the better the government.
ARISTOTLE, POLIrlcs, Book VIII, Ch. 1
Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction
of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention
that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, how-
ever, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction.
The more they are instructed the less liable they are to the delu-
sions of enthusiasm and superstitition, which, among ignorant
nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An in-
structed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and
orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves,
each individually, more respectable and more likely to obtain the
respect of their lawful superiors, and they are therefore more dis-
posed to respect those superiors.
ADAm SD=nH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book V, Ch. 1, Part III, Art. II
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this Article is that courts should not compensate pupils
who have not profited from public school instruction, even in a case where
the proof establishes standards of instruction and shows both a breach
of those standards and that the breach caused the failure of the plaintiff
and produced foreseeable, ictual damages. The reason posited is that for
our common good schools should operate to socialize children for the bene-
fit of their elders and fellows, and not specifically to serve individual
pupils. The more superficial ground of this Article is that the relationship
of public school teacher or public school and pupil is not of a type which
the common law recognizes as creating an expectation of skill in the one
to produce beneficial results in the other. Certain state statutes and re-
cent federal statutes, including those conditioning grants-in-aid for edu-
cation of the handicapped, should be read, in light of the common law,
not to create private claims for money damages for misfeasance or non-
feasance, and the operation of state and federal constitutional clauses
should not change that conclusion. Thus, the focus of this Article concerns
educational malpractice with particular emphasis on the unsuccessful edu-
cation of handicapped pupils.
[Vol. 45
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This Article approaches the education of handicapped pupils as part
of education generally. Consistent with that view, it first reviews the
common law, then inspects the special education statutes, and finally ex-
plores various constitutional and educational legislative bases upon which
a handicapped pupil or other student might seek to base a claim for dam-
ages.
II. CommoN LAW
A. The Governmental Character of School Boards
Going to school and sending one's child to school are duties of citizen-
ship. In fact, young citizens must attend school and their parents must
send them. Failure to send one's child to school is often a crime.1 Essential-
ly, school attendance is the performance of a mandatory obligation, not a
bargaining with an independent contractor for services. In other words,
school boards are authorities who exercise governmenta 2 power over young
citizens, the pupils. The pupils are not clients, but the minor subjects of
legitimate local governmental control.
Reflection upon the governmental nature of public education should
reveal the detriment of creating a tort for educational malpractice. To
create such a tort implies that the law should also create torts to compen-
sate persons who claim some loss because of inefficient police patrol, tardy
court administration, or inflationary management of the money supply.
Despite the sympathy felt for injured crime victims, frustrated plaintiffs,
and poor persons with fixed incomes, they are not allowed to sue constables,
magistrates, or central bankers. Some important reasons not to permit such
suits8 are the risk of error which derives from the multiplicity of causes
1. Compulsory attendance is directed both at the child, in neglect and
truancy provisions, and at the parent, in penalty provisions. 68 Am. JUR. 2d
Schools § 227 (1973); 59 Am. JuR. 2d Parent & Child § 57 (1971). An illustrative
statutory scheme is found in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 26-1 to -12 (Smith-Hurd
1961 & Gum. Supp. 1980-1981). If a pupil or his parents dissent from the curricu-
lum, the pupil must attend but need not participate actively in those exercises
which he regards as ceremonies or liturgies of belief contrary to his own. See West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). This passive right
of nonparticipation probably extends to nonreligious grounds of dissent which
are sincere and deep. Id. at 634-35. But the first amendment privilege of walking
out of the schoolhouse in violation of local compulsory attendance laws may ex-
tend only to religious dissent and then only after the age of 14. See generally
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2. See 4 J. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1658 (5th ed.
1911); 2 F. HARPR & F. JAxvms, Tim LAw OF TORTS § 29.6, at 1624 n.30 (1956);
18 E. McQuILLN, TIm LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.30, .93 (3d ed.
1949-1951); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 980 n.98 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Besides separation of powers, the nonjusticiabiity of standards, and the
unique difficulty of ascertaining causation in educational malpractice suits, the
traditional rationales for municipal tort immunity also apply. These are: the
diversion of funds from general welfare to individual claimants, the disruptive
effect on local government of the litigation process itself, and the fact that absence
of a profit motive in government operations entitles local government to some
leniency. See 2 F. HARPR & F. JAlm~s, supra note 2, §§ 29.5-.6.
1980]
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of loss and the problematic nature of proof of cause in fact,4 the unfore-
sceability of many losses,5 and judicial incompetence to formulate, articu-
late, and promulgate measures of adequate governmental conduct6 when
little consensus exists as to what are good or bad practices, and when
many factions propose very different standards about which there is heated
ethical, technical, and political controversy.7 The common theme under-
4. The multiplicity of causes and their complexity is the most frequent
practical objection to creation of educational negligence torts. See Elson, A Com-
mon Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless
Teaching, 73 Nw. L. REv. 641, 746-54 (1978).
5. Even if cause in fact can be ascertained, the actual consequences of gov-
ernment operations typically are not proximate in the legal sense. The privilege
of policy makers to experiment is essential and motivates immunity from suit for
legislative action by local government. 4 J. DILLON, supra note 2, § 1627; 18 E.
McQUILLN, supra note 2, § 56.36.
6. Elson, supra note 4, at 667-92. In Jones v. Alexandria School Bd., 179
F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1959), afrd, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960), the court
declared that sifting conflicting educational opinions is not a proper function of
a court. Another court has made the broad statement that most educational questions
are for "educators and not courts." Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of
Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
In McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. III. 1968), affd per curiam
sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), a three-judge panel in Chicago
declined the invitation of the parties to rule upon local financing methods by
drawing inferences from economics. That the productivity of a dollar spent in
education one place might be greater or less than the outcome or result of a dollar
spent elsewhere is a question courts should not answer because they "cannot pro-
vide the empirical research and consultation necessary for intelligent educational
planning." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted). The express rationale of the three-judgeopinion is nonjusticiability. The opinion notes that nonjusticiable questions in-
clude not only political questions in the narrow sense, but also any question for
the answer of which the courts lack "'discoverable and manageable standards."'
Id. at 335 (footnote omitted). The opinion reasons that courts must refrain from
nonjusticiable questions because their resolution is a legislative prerogative. In
speaking of legislative prerogative, the court states correctly that a law may be
erroneous or unscientific, but that "'[m ] ere errors of government are not subject
to ... judicial review."' Id. at 333 (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of
Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 70 (1913)). The analysis of economic and financial issues
in education should apply with equal weight to psychological and instructional
methodological debates, and the restraining principle of Mclnnis applies with
yet greater force to special education disputes.
7. In Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162,
167 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977), the judge remarked,
"When persons holding doctorates in education can't agree, it would be no more
absurd for me to prescribe medical treatment than it would be for me to rank
educators' tests." See also Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
where the court characterized the disputes about ability grouping and related
methods as a "sea of factual contentions" not manageable by the courts.
Professor Elson has polled the nation's most illustrious educational researchers
to ascertain which of any of the instructional methods labeled in a widely distrib-
uted handbook has been validated as effective. None has been so validated. Elson,
supra note 4, at 711 & n.266. Citing sociological surveys of teacher attitudes, Pro-
fessor Elson has also noted the tendency of teachers toward skepticism regarding
assessment of educational techniques and materials, and their general repugnance
to consult with one another unless ordered to so consult. Id. at 730. See also
[Vol. 45
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lying these reasons is the inappropriateness of courts to determine such
issues. But more importantly, to allow educational malpractice suits con-
tradicts the bases of representative government.8
Public schools, like other governmental authorities, require some
measure of unreviewable discretion and, more than most agencies, require
the security of being able to allocate genuinely necessary review to agencies
more appropriate than common law juries. Without such discretion, crea-
tive systems of instruction will never occur and the morale needed to de-
velop enthusiasm in devising improvements for youth will fail.9 The cost
and disruption to instruction caused by tort litigation will hurt the ma-
jority of pupils not litigating.
But more significantly, the welfare of society is not fostered by tort
litigation concerning educational effectiveness. Tort litigation by individ-
ual pupil plaintiffs tends to transform public schools into a regime of
laissez faire, away from their historic and realistic function of fostering
order in society. The tendency of educational malpractice litigation would
be to force a school board to make concessions affecting its methods, stand-
ards, and curriculum to obstinate pupils or parents in order to avoid law-
suits. Such litigation would create a drive toward a passive policy of
reaction to pupil demand' 0 and away from attention to the needs of so-
ciety as a whole. The taxpayers want schools not necessarily because of
their altruism toward pupils, but for the good of society generally. To
invite tort litigation is practically to de-emphasize the societal interests
which principally account for the existence of public schools and to in-
flate the interests of pupils. It is in this sense that the rationale of educa-
tional malpractice is alien to the concept and function of public schools.
The historic reason for public schools in Western Civilization is to
better enculturate young persons into society and to train them to meet
authorities cited note 52 infra. In these circumstances, it is not extreme to say that
causes, standards, and methodology in education are topics "so bitterly contentious
as to be... incapable of solution" by the courts. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limita-
tion, 37 HARv. L. RrLv. 338, 345 (1924). But see Comment, Damages Actions for
Denial of Equal Educational Opportunities, 45 Mo. L. R.v. 281, 299-302 (1980).
8. Creation of a tort of educational malpractice is an undeniable contra-
diction of pure democratic principles. Elson, supra note 4, at 660. See generally
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
9. The worst result would be conscious repeal of minimum standards. Cali-
fornia repealed its minimum standards statute in response to rumblings about
malpractice claims against those not meeting them. This vitiation of legislative
stimulation to improvement illustrates the unwholesome tendency of malpractice
torts. Abel, Can a Student Sue the Schools for Educational Malpractice?, 44 HARv:
Enuc. R.v. 416, 433-34 (1974).
10. If and when teacher performance becomes privately actionable, then "the
student's motive and attitude change. The class turns into a clientele to be satis-
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society's expectations of them."' Public schools help preserve existing in-
stitutions by increasing the probability that children will adjust to them.
This function is necessary to the continuation of modem industrial eco-
nomies and parliamentary democracy, the advance of technology, national
security, and to the restraint required for life in urbanized countries with
large populations. 12 Even its critics acknowledge that this is and has been
11. One author has described the essential function of the public schools
in cultural terms:
The essential function of a publicly supported school system is to perpet-
uate the culture of which it is a part. This is done by perpetuating the
core values and by developing in the learner the kinds of behavior which
will enable him to participate in the cultural setting as it is and as it is
developing, so as to maintain the essential core values that the members
of the culture want to maintain.
EDUCATION AND ANTHROPOLOGY 24 (G. Spindler ed. 1955). The development of
the public school system has also been traced to society's need to train its young
members for their adult roles in an increasingly complex and changing social
structure:
The most important tradition in the sociological analysis of the aims of
education has been the study of the relation between such aims and the
general values of society, with special reference to the social control over
the aims of education. The primary conclusion supported by this research
is that the aims of education are in the last analysis prescribed and legiti-
mized by the community (or society) in which the institution exists. When
the culture becomes so complex that it cannot be transmitted without an
additional formal system, a separate educational structure arises. This
institutional enterprise is chartered by society to train society's members
for adequate adult role performance. The aims of education are consonant
with the conceptions of the ideal adult which society wishes to produce
and the educational institution possesses legitimate power to pursue its
aims only to the extent that they are in fact those which society considers
desirable.
0. BRIM, SOCIOLOGY AND THE FIELD OF EDUCATION 15 (1958). See also Mailloux v.
Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.) (public schools are expected to "in-
doctrinate" the younger generation in community mores), affd per curiam, 448
F.2d 1242 (Ist Cir. 1971); S. KImALL, CULTURE AND Tm EDUCATIONAL PROCESS
161 (1974) (even the cognitive domain of public school instruction "primarily
constitutes cultural transmission"); R. POUNDS 8 J. BRYNER, THE SCHOOL IN AME P-
CAN SOCIETY 66 (3d ed. 1973) ("the school has developed as a separate institution
in order to carry out the aims of its society ... for the education of the young");
Project, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. Rzv. 1045,
1053 (1968) ("one function of elementary and even secondary education is in-
doctrinative-to transmit to succeeding generations the body of knowledge and
set of values shared by members of the community"). See generally C. BREMsECK,
SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS or EDUCATION (2d ed. 1971).
12. Complexity compels public schools. Even the iconoclast economist Carnoy
concedes, "In most societies, formal schooling is an important institution for
transmitting knowledge and culture . . . and for developing human traits that
contribute to economic output, social stability, and the production of new know-
ledge." M. CARNOY, EDUCATION AS CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 1 (1974). Echoing the
inevitable need for public schools is the famous judicial dictum in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which constitutes powerful evidence of the pre-
valence of the assumption of the cultural and socializing role of the schools:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
[Vol. 45
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the function of public education,13 and the prevailing opinions of legal,
educational, and anthropological scholars who have considered the ques-
tion agree that such a function should be the role of public schools. 14 Each
generation of infants requires socialization and enculturation. In that
sense, civilization is never more than twenty years away from extinction.
Given its vulnerability, society should foster and strengthen public school
authority, not dilute it.15 Necessary criticism should come through broad,
public, systematic channels, viz., by way of representative government.
Necessary intervention in specific cases ought to be provided through com-
petent administrative channels,16 whose actions are not likely to cause
resentment by educational officials or disrespect by pupils, either of which
could destroy the governmental role of public schools. In a nutshell, edu-
cational malpractice litigation is against public policy.
In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,17 the New York
Court of Appeals used an underlying rationale of public policy to reject
an educational malpractice claim. Although the complaint alleged or
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment.
Id. at 493.
13. M. CAR oy, supra note 12, at 1. See generally I. ILucH, DEsa HooLING
SociEry (1971).
14. For an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the wide range of theories
which have been postulated to explain the development of public schools and
their ideal function in a period of social change, see R. POUNDS & J. BRYNER, supra
note 11, at 526-51. The views discussed include perennialism (or neohumanism),
essentialism (or social evolutionism), social realism, experimentalism, reconstruc-
tionism, laissez faire, and existentialism. As noted by Pounds and Bryner, peren-
nialism "conceives of the main job of education as the development of the intellect
and the transmission of the great ideas (unchanging ideas) of the past, so that they
will be thoroughly understood by at least the elite of the present generation." Id.
at 564. Essentialism emphasizes "the importance of the school as an agency for
preserving the culture against some of its own defects-such as forgetfulness
of the essentials of the past and the tendency to be carried away by the exi-
gencies of the moment." Id. Social realism urges that "the values that the school
should be teaching are those that are prevailing in the culture." Id. Experimental-
ism perceives the role of the school "as to develop critical-minded thinkers and
thereby persons who will exercise creative leadership at all levels." Id. According
to the reconstructionists, the school is an agent of society which "should help
society to accomplish that which it is not able to do by itself, namely, its own
reconstruction." Id. at 565. The laissez-faire view holds that the school should
try "to help each individual to his own best self-realizAtion." Id. Existentialism places
less weight upon the school as a vehicle for cultural indoctrination, but rather is
concerned with "the individual and the necessity for his free choice." Id. Pounds
and Bryner state that adherents to the first three schools greatly outnumber ad-
herents to the last four and include such famous commentators as J.M. Hutchins,
M. Adler, and J.B. Conant. They claim that most educationalists and school of-
ficials tend toward social realism.
15. See generally J. BAREZN, THE HousE or INmuLTxr (1959).
16. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 444-45,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377-78 (1979).
17. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
1980]
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intimated special learning problems of the plaintiff,'8 the court of appeals
acknowledged the nonjusticiability of such claims because present know,
ledge and the circumstances of child development made formulation of
standards and proof of causation nearly impossible.' 9 But the opinion
went beyond this reasoning. The court suggested that what made the tort
repugnant was its consumerist, nongovernmental conception of public
education. It analyzed the intent of the people, as set forth in the state
constitution, and of the legislature as enacted in the education code, to
create a school system for public purposes rather than a private entitle-
ment of any single pupil or parent.20 The justices unanimously agreed
that such a claim should not be actionable even if unusually clear facts
of a particular case and future research should cure the barriers of un-
ascertainable standards and unprovable causes. In the view of the court,
it is against public policy to give relief even to a hypothetically clear claim
because to do so might intrude on the discretion of the legislative and ad-
ministrative agencies to formulate, change, and reformulate educational
systems and programs.21
In contexts other than damage claims by pupils for allegedly inade-
quate instruction, courts have considered the nature and function of public
schools and the duty of local school districts. The prevailing concept is
that public schools are not institutions primarily for the benefit of indi-
viduals but are agencies of government,2 2 and that education is a process
18. Id. at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77.
19. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
20. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1978), which sustained a damages complaint of a young man who examiners
ound was clearly not mentally impaired as the New York City schools had pre-
sumed for his entire school career. A tentative psychological diagnosis when the
plaintiff was in kindergarten had never been reconsidered despite the psycholo-
gist's own written recommendation for re-examination within two years. Erroneous
class placement and the consequential loss of cognitive development were not
disputed. Given the egregious facts of Hoffman, it should now be read as a rare
case which falls within the proviso set forth in Donohue that it would be in-
correct " 'to say that there may never be gross violations of defined public policy
which the courts would be obliged to recognize and correct.'" 47 N.Y.2d at 445,
391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (quoting New York City School Bds. Ass'n
v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 121, 347 N.E.2d 568, 574, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214
(1976)). The real complaint in Hoffman was not the poor quality of instruction,
nor inept psychological services, but rather the total loss of a pupil by the school
system. The court which decided Hoffman was the same court which had rejected
the claim of the pupil in Donohue a few months earlier. See Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d
440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). The public policy considerations
which led to the affirmance of Donohue encompass Hoffman as well, even though
the latter case is not mentioned in the Donohue opinion.
21. See Elson, supra note 4, at 642.
22. See Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N.E. 276 (1914), where the court
declared:
School districts are involuntary political divisions of the state, each em-
bracing a certain territory and all the inhabitants thereof, organized for
the public advantage and not in the interest of individuals, having for
their purpose the exercise within their territory, by their inhabitants and
(Vol. 45
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pupils are required to undergo for the public good.23 General promotion
of the intelligence, usefulness, and efficiency of the citizenry and labor
force as a whole is the rationale of public schools.2 4 Viewed from this
perspective, school districts are subdivisions which participate in a state-
regulated scheme; they implement state policy for state purposes, and
ultimately are overseen by state authorities and the legislature. 25 These
authorities recognize that schools are governmental, and that pupils are
minor subjects of government officials rather than clients of professionals.
This relationship between school and pupil is not the sort which tradition-
ally gives rise to a claim for malpractice.
B. The Nonprofessional Status of Teachers
School boards have discretion but teachers do not.26 Public school
teachers are obliged to teach the subjects and to use the methods and
materials their employer requires, even if they believe the methods are
oppressive or idolatrous.27 A school board recruits and employs teachers
to impart to pupils the curriculum the board has designated, and assign-
ment of teachers and pupils to schoolhouses and classrooms typically is
performed by the school board and its high level staff.28 Communications
between pupil and teacher are institutional, not privileged.2 9 The principal
duty of a teacher is to obey his employer, his principal, and other super-
visors his employer designates.0
School teachers are often young themselves, and their preparation, a
normal school diploma or an education "major" from a college, is not
typically challenging.31 Citizens expect good character, kindliness, literate-
for their benefit, of that part of the governmental function committed to
them.
Id. at 314, 106 N.E. at 280.
23. See generally Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 32 A. 348 (1894); Fogg v.
Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912).
24. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Educ., 234 Ill. App. 141 (1924); Ransom v.
Rutherford County, 123 Tenn. 1, 130 S.W. 1057 (1909); Newman v. Schlarb, 184
Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36 (1935).
25. See Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977) (state
education agency and local school boards are required to maintain a "system").
26. See generally Karpelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.
1975); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 972 (1973); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th
Cir. 1975); Hibbs v. Board of Educ., 392 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Iowa 1975).
27. See, e.g., Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
28. A board of education acts in a governmental capacity in employing and
assigning teachers. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83
A.2d 482 (1951).
29. See Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g
(1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
30. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 2-3.25, 3-14.6 (Smith-Hurd 1961 &
Cum. Supp. 1980).
31. Professor Elson, citing sociologists of education, calls teacher preparation
intellectually "shallow." Elson, supra note 4, at 730.
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ness, and a small bit of enthusiasm from teachers, but do not expect dis-
cretion in matters of educational strategy.82 One court explained this
sentiment when it said:
The secondary school... acts in loco parentis with respect to
minors.... Some teachers and most students have limited intel-
lectual and emotional maturity. Most parents, students, school
boards, and members of the community usually expect the secon-
dary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information,
teaching "the best that is known and thought in the world,"
training by established techniques, and, to some extent at least,
indoctrinating in the mores of the surrounding society.8 8
The role of a teacher is important, even critical. But it is not pro-
fessional in the sense intended by the law of malpractice. It is not a
learned profession.8 4 It is governed by hierarchical bureaucracies and not
by the profession itself.88 It is a role in which the discretion of individual
performing members is closely limited, and does not require trust and
confidence in the same manner that the work of a physician or lawyer
requires them. 30 The role of a teacher is not to participate in consensual
32. The surveys Elson cites indicate that most parents regard public school
teachers as only a little more knowledgeable than others about child development
and educational practices. Id.
33. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affd per curiam,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
34. In American social science literature, publishers and academics typically
organize the study of professions within the scope of sociology. Among other as-
pects of work, sociologists study: (1) demographic characteristics of memberships,
(2) associations between occupation and prevailing general character and values
of members, and (3) the pattern of recurring relations and methods the work itself
contains. This Article is concerned with the latter collection of matters which may
be called the criteria of professional work, in essence, the job description of a
professional. This grouping is particularly relevant because the law of negligence
is concerned with the outward conduct or behavior of persons in concrete instances,
and not with their childhood origins, personalities, or behavior generally.
Reading the sources cited by Elson, supra note 4, leads the author, upon re-
flection, to conclude that there exist some 13 earmarks of a profession and that
school teaching manifests none of them except the first, which it displays to excess.
Further analysis is left to the reader. The 13 earmarks of a profession are these:
practical applications, intellectual methods, extensive preparation, autonomous
performance, self regulation, articulate principles, acute tasks, atomistic organiza-
tion, discreet style, public reliance, collegial deliberations, fiduciary relations, and
legal responsibility.
35. This is especially true of large, urban school systems. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 122, §§ 34-7,-18 (Smith-Hurd 1961 Sc Gum. Supp. 1980-1981). For a
helpful analysis of the unavoidable conflict between hierarchical control of schools
and the attributes of professional work, see R. CoRwIN, A SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
277-78 (1965).
36. No one suggests that public school teacher and pupil is a fiduciary re-
lationship like that of attorney and client or physician and patient. Trust and
confidence are the essence of the attorney-client relationship. 7 AM. JUR. 2d At-
torneys at Law § 119 (1980). Trust and confidence are also important aspects of
the physidan-patient relationship. 61 AM. Jux. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Healers § 100 (1972). In contrast, teachers are often, like constables, keepers of
public peace and enforcers of mandatory attendance laws. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
122, §§ 26-9, 34-84a (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
[Vol. 45
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/5
SPECIAL EDUCATION MALPRACTICE
relationships with pupils; 87 the duty of a teacher is to follow the orders
of superiors. It would be unfair to submit a teacher to malpractice liabil-
ity given such a role.38 But suing school boards instead of teachers is even
worse.
The gist of such a claim would invariably implicate some criticism
of the plans, methods, organization, or supervision of the school, i.e., a
systematic factor.3 9 In other words, creation of a tort of educational mal-
practice necessarily will produce litigation before juries regarding questions
of good government or good school management. Such issues are for public
political resolution in school board elections by the electorate at large,
and are not suited to potentially conflicting resolutions by ad hoc panels
of no more than twelve citizens. If an expectation of good government is
a right in any sense, it is a general political right whose source is citizenship.
By contrast, the source of a malpractice right lies in a consensual
relationship between a layman and a learned, independent, and skilled
professional who exercises individual discretion to ameliorate a particular
private condition or accomplish a particular private, task. The law re-
quires 'reasonable prudence by the professional and makes want of such
care actionable in the tort of malpractice. The motives of the tort are the
unique expectations that come from such a special relationship and the
consensual element by which the layman chooses one professional and
thus, at least for a time, practically forgoes the opportunity to attend
another. Also motivating the tort is the typical obligation of the layman
to pay a separately identified fee for special attention to his case, condi-
tion, or objective.
Neither public school teachers nor public school boards perform any
similar function. Rather, they are tax-supported governmental institutions
and their governmental function will suffer if the courts create a tort of
educational malpractice because such a tort would require school boards
to select curricula, methods, and budgets in a manner which is the easiest
or cheapest to defend in a multitude of vexatious and potentially incon-
sistent trials. School policies motivated by avoidance of such litigation are
37. One author has pointed out that in institutionalized education in ad-
vanced societies pupils are taught by "strangers." S. KimBALL, supra note 11, at
16. It can certainly be argued that teachers in departmentalized schools remain
strangers to their pupils throughout the school year. This is inconsistent with the
usual justification for liability in malpractice-an undertaking to use special
ability in a voluntary, one-to-one relationship. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, SUpra
note 2, § 16.6, at 918; W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 165.
38. Like other public employees, teachers must act in the circumstances given
to them and are not free to decline a case or refuse a patient. 2 F. HARpER & F.
JAwEs, supra note 2, § 29.9, at 1635. Moreover, absent a statute authorizing in-
demnity by the public employer, a public school teacher, unlike a servant of a
private firm, would have little opportunity to seek indemnification from her em-
ployer even in a sympathetic case. Id.
39. When indemnity is possible, then either the principal suit or a third
party action by the public school teacher defendant will nearly always call official
school plans and programs into question, thus making the state or its school board
subdivision the real defendant. Id. § 29.9, at 1634-36.
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likely to be unresponsive to the will of the entire community. The selec-
tion of means motivated by avoidance of verdicts is unlikely to coincide
with methods best calculated to fulfill the discretionary, societal, civilizing,
and governmental functions of local public schools. To acknowledge or
create a tort of educational malpractice is to deny both the need for posi-
tive government and the value of representative government.
C. The Curriculum
An incisive way to ascertain the objective of a school is to inspect its
program of studies or curriculum. Curricula are not left solely to local
choice, much less to the choice of parent or pupil. Legislatures mandate a
great part of what is taught and recently have been active in reinforcing
prior requirements and conventional expectations. 4 0 A not untypical pro-
gram prescribes inculcation in pupils of the following traits beneficial to
society: good citizenship and obedience to the law, adjustment to economic
roles in a mixed free enterprise system, resource conservation, safety on the
highway and elsewhere, hygiene, commitment to representative govern-
ment, poise, good posture, cooperation with the law, patriotism, sociability,
and skill in using the English language to write and speak.41
This control over public school curricula is a matter of discretion
virtually impenetrable even to first amendment attack.42 This curricular
power is ultimately enforced by compulsory attendance laws which sig-
nificantly extend the operation of mandated curricula to private schools
by the typical equivalency clauses in attendance laws.4 8 Besides banding
40. Some instruction about the United States Constitution and American
institutions is mandated in every state. 8 THE ENCYLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION 281-82
(1971). Besides the Constitution, the subjects most frequently mandated are the
"three R's," followed by grammar, penmanship, spelling, and social studies, where
civics, race relations, and North American geography are prominent. The next
most frequent topic is hygiene, including now frequent mandates to teach about
the harm of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. Physical science and physical education
are next, followed by American history. The fine arts, which usually mean vocal
music and drawing, are sometimes mandated, as are nature study, agriculture, and
a foreign language. Consumer and sex education courses are also becoming re-
quired. Humanities, history other than American history, most fine arts, mathe-
matics beyond arithmetic, and biological science beyond "health" are hardly ever
mandated. THE COURTS AND EDUCATION-THE SEvENTY-SEvNTH YEARBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL SocIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION 142-45 (C. Hooker ed. 1978). See
generally Edelman, Basic American, 6 NOLPE Scm. L.J. 83 (1976).
41. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 27-1 to -21 (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Cum. Supp.
1980-1981).
42. See cases cited notes 26 & 27 supra. The general failure of parents to win
exemption for their children from mandatory subjects is outlined in THE COURTS
AND EDUCATIoN-THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
THE STUDY OF EDUCATION 148-59 (C. Hooker ed. 1978), which also outlines the
parental victories in cases attacking mandatory prayer and Bible reading.
43. The argument for narrow substantive due process limits on legislative
power to designate programs for private schools was revitalized with the dicta in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), to the effect that the state
may require certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship but may not
standardize all pupils, noted with approval in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232-33 (1972). See also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Meyer v.
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together with others to form an "equivalent" private school, the only
escape well recognized before 1972 was silent nonparticipation during pas-
sive attendance in ceremonial activities repugnant to one's religion.4 4 But
in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder,45 the United States Supreme Court created
a privilege of nonattendance for dissenting pupils older than age fourteen
who are motivated by religion in the conventional sense. 46 The power to
legislate curricula, however, overpowers first amendment claims of non-
conforming teachers whose dissent is not protected 47 even when motivated
by religion.48 Overall, the right of the legislature to designate the pro-
gram of studies for the public schools of its state is a right rarely ques-
tioned. 49
The relationship of legislatively prescribed curricula to malpractice
should be apparent. If the service performed by teachers in public schools
is a governmental exercise to which unwilling pupils of unwilling parents
may be subjected under sanction of punishment, then how meaningful is
it to speak of instruction as a profession or trade service, negligence in which
should be actionable? The question is comparable to an inquiry whether
a counselor or jailer in a prison organized on a rehabilitative model should
be answerable in damages to an unreformed prisoner.
D. Handicapped Pupils and Public Purpose
There is no good reason to suppose that legislatures or state consti-
tutional conventions have intended ultimate curricular objectives for
handicapped pupils to be different from general objectives in a way
which would change the role of pupil and school. Indeed, where differ-
ences are stated, they typically emphasize the needs of society more, not
less, including the containment of relief roles and integration into regular
classes. 50
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 '(1923). The Meyer opinion, however, notes that substantive
due process principles do not imply any limit on the power of a state to prescribe
curricula for schools it supports. Id. at 402. One authority which has analyzed
this series of cases has pointed out that recently courts have not had to weigh non-
religious philosophical dissent against state prerogatives. THE COURTs AND EDUCA-
TIoN-THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH YEARBOOK or THE NATIONAL SocIETY FOR TmE STUDY
or EDUCATION 130-38 (C. Hooker ed. 1978).
44. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
45. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
46. Id. at 219-20, 228-29.
47. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd per cur-
iam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
48. Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
49. The United States Supreme Court is convinced of the "undoubted right
to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools" held by each state legislature.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). The Epperson decision affirmed
state court decisions which had invalidated a law making teaching of evolutionary
theories a misdemeanor.
50. For economic reasons alone a state cannot afford to abandon efforts to
educate all children because experience has taught that it costs more to support
a few ignorant persons or to control a few vicious persons than to educate many.
See Yale v. West Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 492, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890).
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There are two barriers to educational torts which are often men-
tioned 5l but less compelling than the governmental considerations to re-
frain from such a tort. The first is undefined standards. Educators cannot
agree which educational practices are good or bad.52 A fortiori, the courts
lack competence or conceptual resources to formulate standards5 when
teachers and researchers themselves cannot devise yardsticks by which to
measure school methods. The second barrier often given is that causes of
educational outcomes are complicated and indeterminate.
A problem perhaps even more impenetrable to adjudication is cau-
sation.54 The sources of failure and differences in pupil achievement are
what the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
called a "sea of factual contentions." 55 In any particular case, causation is
even more problematic than general research conclusions about sources
of school achievement or failure.5  In one word, the merit of an educa-
tional malpractice claim is nonjusticiable.
There are, however, limits to this theory. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text
infra. A contrary theory is the handicapped-child-centered approach. For example,
compulsory attendance laws were used to imply a substantive right to special edu-
cation in Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The court noted
that the absence of any express exemption of handicapped pupils and their parents
from attendance laws and correlative criminal sanctions presupposes a legislative
intent to provide handicapped pupils with some instruction congenial to them.
The author disagrees. Attendance laws are enactments for society and do not create
substantive rights of individuals. As to the argument regarding sanctions, proof
of presentation of the child to school authorities and exclusion by them would
constitute a defense to a criminal prosecution. In any event, prosecution is unlikely
since the school authorities themselves usually stimulate charges of the type in
question, and in many locales, actually prosecute the cases.
51. See notes 4-7 and accompanying text supra.
52. See note 7 supra. See also J. DEwEY, THE SOURCES OF A SCIENCE OF EDU-
CATION 76-77 (1929); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION, RESEARCH FOR TOMOR-
Row's SCHooLs: DISCIPLINED INQUIRY FOR EDUCATION 48 (1969); J. Coleman,
Methodological Principles Governing Policy Research in Social Sciences 5 (Dec.,
1972) (paper presented to meeting of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, Washington, D.C.), noted in W. COOLEY & P. LOHNES, EVALUATION
R.sEARCH IN EDUCATION 342-44 (1976).
53. See Moynihan, The Courts and Social Science, 54 PUBLIC INTEREST 12, 17
(1979) (noting that social science is labile in the extreme, tentative, unstable,
and beset with variables so complex that it cannot usually predict behavior). See
also McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd per curiam sub
nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
54. The concurrence in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47
N.Y.2d 440, 445-46, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-79 (1979) (Wacht-
ler, J., concurring), notes that the "practical impossibility" of proving that alleged
malpractice proximately caused a learning deficiency is the most fundamental
objection to educational malpractice cases. See also Elson, supra note 4, at 746-54
(an optimistic view as to how further research might someday make proof of cau-
sation possible, but conceding the present impossibility of proving causation).
55. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. During the course of a public school career a pupil will experience a
substantial number of elementary, junior high, and high school teachers. Assum-
ing only moderate teacher turnover and infrequent residential movement by the
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Federal law concerning the handicapped is no different. It defines
special education to be special "instruction" and services which support
"instruction" and which facilitate maximum exposure to and participation
within the regular program by handicapped pupils. 57 Title 45, sections
121a.550-.556 of the Code of Federal Regulations5 s restate the goal of
integration into typical school experiences. 59 What these authorities im-
ply is that the role of a special education teacher no more supports a tort
of malpractice than does that of a regular teacher. Indeed, there are in-
evitable organizational difficulties with providing special education which
weigh even more heavily against such a tort in the case of education for
the handicapped.6 0 Additionally, the nonjusticiability of standards and
indeterminateness of causation become more acute in attempting to sup-
port a special education malpractice claim.
Regarding nonjusticiability, handicapped education is more tentative
and labile than education generally. The state of the arts of psychology,
teaching, and physiology has not enabled special educators accurately to
diagnose causes of learning problems, much less to prescribe instructional
strategies. 61 But supporting a causal relationship for a handicapped stu-
dent's malpractice claim is even more troublesome.
If causation of handicaps is problematic, alleged causation of handi-
cap aggravation by misfeasance is even more so. Despite an explosive
growth in research for special education over the last quarter century,
handicapped pupils have experienced few significant gains from special
instruction or curricula.62 There exists in the case of profound or complex
handicaps the real possibility that even huge increases in instructional
skill, manpower, and other "inputs" would not have produced any meas-
urable increase in achievement or output. This unhappy fact makes mal-
practice actions especially inappropriate in special education. Such a tort
might invite some juries to disregard the element of causation and pro-
vide a welfare payment or sympathy verdict to a handicapped person, not
pupil, a would-be plaintiff will encounter three or four dozen instructors in
various schools. The prospect of multiparty litigation among different schools in
different locales about "who caused what" would lead any sensible citizen to op-
pose the whole idea of educational malpractice litigation. Some of these multiple
defendants would be new teachers who are not effective, but are trying to improve;
some would be old-timers past their prime who once had more energy. See 2 F.
HARER & F. JAMrs, supra note 2, § 16.6, for a discussion of the problem of be-
ginners and the concept of average skill.
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16)-(17) (1976).
58. (1979).
59. To give an example applicable to one handicap, 20 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976),
authorizes grants and loans of materials for deaf education designed to bring deaf
pupils into "better touch with the realities of their environment" by showing
them materials important to "the general and cultural advancement of hearing
persons."
60. See generally Milofsky, Why Special Education Isn't Special, 44 HAuv.
EDuc. RExv. 437 (1974).
61. Id. at 438.
62. Id. at 438-39. See generally R. MAcalE, SPECIAL EDUCATION IN T=l UNrrE
STATES: STATISTICS, 1948-1966 (1969).
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because the defendant school caused him harm, but because it could do
little for him to begin with. The tendency of such sympathy to convert
educational appropriations of public money from intended school purposes
to welfare grants is a serious jeopardy. If, as a people, we should support
unfortunate persons more generously and appropriate correspondingly
less resources to governmental alternatives such as the public schools, then
let us do so by evaluation of competing claims for money in the legislative
process and not by creating a new tort.
F. Volunteers, Promisors, Warrantors,
and Similar Roles
In cases which recognize contractual rights of students,68 defendants
have typically been colleges, usually private colleges, and the claims have
been for damages for refusal to promote or graduate and not for want
of knowledge imparted. 4 The position of an elementary or secondary
pupil in a public school is different from that of a college student. Neither
consideration nor detrimental reliance exists to support claims of the
former because attendance is mandated and free. Public schools impose
requirements, 65 but do not make promises or warranties. Nor do public
schools make representations of fact on which pupils or parents could
reasonably rely even if they had the means to choose alternatives which
would make reliance real. 66
Not only do schools fail to make promises to students, but neither
do school officials volunteer to instruct.67 They legitimately present in-
struction as an act of local government. Instructional activity is unlike that
of rescuers, safety inspectors, or similar volunteers. School activity operates
nearly continuously for over thirteen years, rather than in separate epi-
sodes, and failure is manifested more or less steadily, not suddenly. Thus,
63. See, e.g., cases collected in 15A Aw. JUR. 2d Colleges and Universities §
31, at 293 n.67 (1976).
64. Under a contractual theory, the plaintiff challenged the content and
value of a course for which tuition had been collected in Zumbrum v. University
of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 11, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505 (1972), but the court
found it unnecessary to decide the issue.
65. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
66. In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814,
827-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 863 (1976), the court rejected an argument based on
representations and promises of several teachers, and noted that poverty makes
choice of schools by most claimants an illusion, rendering "reliance" by virtue
of enrollment in a public school a figment also. Principles of public contract law
corroborate the point in that they closely limit claims based either on promises
or representations of public servants whose limited authority to make warranties
and promises shields the public from liability for their inaccurate statements.
"Puffing" by a school teacher of his subject or class is commonplace boasting, and
it is only the most unwise of parents who trusts it without inspection.
67. The Peter W. court rejected the argument that school officials voluntarily
assume a duty to exercise care in instruction, and distinguished imposition of a
duty upon teachers and schools to guard against physical harm to pupils where
liability is based upon a statute and not on common law liability of volunteers.
Id. at 820-21, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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the classical theory of tort liability of a volunteer would fail even for a
free academy: its actions do not lull plaintiffs away from alternative sources
of services before it is too late, and do not inhibit or deter more efficient
operators.
HI. STATE SCHOOL CODES
Neither general articles nor special education articles of state statutes
are intended to create private causes of action for ineffective instruction.
They tend to read like intergovernmental rules with state control evi-
dent. 68 Nor is there cause to believe that Congress intended to change this
situation.
IV. FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AiD STATUTES
A. Private Right or Not
1. Rehabilitation Act and Title VI
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197369 is part of a grant-in-
aid statute between sovereigns. The detailed provisions of the Act indicate
no intent to create a private right. On the contrary, it creates elaborate
administrative compliance, audit, and adjudicatory enforcement mechan-
isms. Section 721(b)70 provides for an administrative trial, while section
721(d)71 provides for judicial review by federal courts of appeals. There
is no provision for private suit in a federal district court or state court.
That is not the purpose of the Act.
The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is to provide grants-
in-aid and the regulation thereof. The statute creates no express private
right, and none is required to accomplish the purpose of extending a
grant-in-aid. The usual rule of statutory construction is that remedial
consequences are implied only if necessary or essential to accomplish legis-
lative purposes.7 2 The existence of administrative enforcement machinery
makes private suits unnecessary. The machinery is outlined in title 45,
section 84.61 of the Code of Federal Regulations,78 which incorporates by
reference the procedures HEW uses to enforce Title VI.4 The background
information to those regulations, promulgated pursuant to section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act,7 5 notes that "[t]he language of Section 504 is
almost identical to the comparable nondiscrimination provision of Title
68. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
443, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II 1978).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 721(b) (Supp. II 1978).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 721(d) (Supp. II 1978).
72. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55.03 (4th
ed. 1973).
73. (1979).
74. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.10, 18.1-.131 (1979).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II 1978).
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VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .. . .,,6 There is a strong segment of
legal opinion which believes that the Civil Rights Act 77 does not create
a private right of action.78
A recent case has construed Title VI as not creating a private claim
in the public education setting. In Coates v. Illinois State Board of Educa-
tion,79 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ex-
pressed the view that Title VI does not create a private cause of action
to compel affirmative action in public education and expressed doubt that
Title VI creates any private action to review educational administration.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided the issue.8 0
In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling, the Coates opin-
ion is strong authority supporting the conclusion that in the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress intended to create no private chose in action because
the language of Title VI construed in Coates is similar to the language of
section 504. Moreover, construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act not to create a private right is consistent with the general character
and other provisions of the Act. Like the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act,81 it is a grant-in-aid statute which provides for administra-
tive procedures and intentionally does not provide for private suits in
court.
Although the trial court in Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Author-
ity had construed the Rehabilitation Act not to create a private, right, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,, 2 even
though it acknowledged the similarity of language between Title VI and
the Act. The specific rationale for the decision was the nonexistence of
administrative remedies. The case involved bus design, not education, and
rested in part upon the Urban Mass Transportation Act.88 Since the time
of that decision, elaborate and detailed regulations for enforcement of the
Rehabilitation Act in education have taken effect. Moreover, other over-
lapping statutes and regulations exist in the educational field to protect
pupils and provide administrative remedies. For that reason, the rationale
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976).
78. A leading commentator has suggested that the existence of a private right
under Title VI is not established. C. ANrxmAu, FEDERAL CnvIL RIGHTS AcTs § 138
(1971). But see id. (Gum. Supp. 1979). The better rule emerging is that a private
right to sue is absent unless the continuation of the federal assistance adversely
affects the particular plaintiff. For a collection of Title VI cases in areas outside
education, see 15 Am. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 93 (1976). For a collection of Title
VI cases in which suit was brought by private persons for educational wrongs, see
id. § 96.
79. 559 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1977).
80. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (the standing of plaintiffs
who alleged violations of the equal protection clause and Title VI was not raised,
tried, or reviewed).
81. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
82. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
83. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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in Lloyd applied to education dictates that there is no room for a private
right of pupils under the Rehabilitation Act, given the wealth of admini-
strative remedies which now exist.
The most authoritative court to consider the existence of a private
right under the Rehabilitation Act in an educational setting followed the
logic of Lloyd and hesitantly concluded that a right existed.8 4 But sub-
sequent regulations and enforcement activity by HEW led another court
in the Second Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion using the same logic
one year later.8 5 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York distinguished the earlier cases8 6 as resting on the previous
hiatus or delay in agency activity. The view that the Rehabilitation Act
creates a private right has been rendered obsolete by virtue of HEW's
vigorous enforcement activities.
The view that a private right exists is untenable for a number of other
reasons. One is that the inference of a private cause of action would pro-
duce anomalous results: school districts receiving no federal funds would
not be liable to private suit, while those receiving such funds would be
liable to private suits involving amounts which in principle could exceed
the amount of federal aid. Courts should not construe statutes so as to
produce such anomalous and unreasonable results. A second reason is
congressional silence. Since Congress has often created express private
rights in civil rights laws, one should assume that Congress is not inad-
vertent in drafting important statutes. Thus, its silence in the statutes
under discussion indicates an intent to create no private right. Nor are
these the only reasons. Courts should not read section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act alone. The intent of Congress in section 504 as it relates to
education is discovered by examining the educational statutes creating
the federally assisted programs in question. This is no more than the fa-
miliar principle that statutes should be construed in pan materia. One
such statute to be construed in pari materia is the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act.87
2. Education for All Handicapped Children Act
Administration and enforcement of the Act by HEW is described in
the Code of Federal Regulations.88 That statute, so administered, creates
no private cause of action for damages. Had Congress intended such a
right it would have expressed it. The omission cannot have been inad-
vertent but must have been intentional because a separate section of the
statute addresses the question of procedural remedies of pupils and par-
84. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). One case
which the Doe court distinguished, Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp.
1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977), had found a private right, but deferred final ruling to
await action by HEW, which was still in a start-up phase in enforcing the Act.
86. 442 F. Supp. at 523.
87. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
88. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.l-.754 (1979).
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ents, including limited judicial review of administrative actions.89 That sec-
tion and the implementing regulations provide for case by case local ad-
ministrative due process hearings, omit independent judicial remedies,
and leave no room for implication of any right to sue for monetary dam-
ages. 0
The intention to create no private cause of action is expressed in
other ways as well. The statute creates two tiers of administrative over-
sight. At one point Congress requires state enforcement, 91 and later pro-
vides for administrative hearings between state and local agencies.92 Then,
20 U.S.C. § 141693 provides for federal administrative adjudication be-
tween HEW and recipients with review by the federal courts of appeals.
Administrative litigation, however, is not the only apparatus.
The implementing regulations require the state to take note of the
outcome of individual due process hearing decisions, 94 and require the
state to provide opportunities for public comment on handicapped educa-
tion in the state.9 5 Thus, aggrieved persons may try their particular cases
before hearing officers and may report to the state any general failures
they believe their case represents. They may seek judicial review of ad-
ministrative adjudications but may not file independent suits or sue for
money damages.
A well-reasoned authority supporting the argument that Congress did
not intend a private cause of action for money damages in the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act is Loughran v. Flanders.90 In Loughran,
the plaintiff sued for monetary and injunctive relief. The school had de-
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). See Eberle v. Board of Public Educ., 444 F.
Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd mem., 582 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978), which indi-
cates that the statute and accompanying regulations allow courts to review hearing
records to assure compliance with administrative procedures, but do not allow
the consideration of substantive educational questions de novo.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)-(7) (1976).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(8) (1976).93. 1976).
94. 45 CF.R. § 121a.193(c) (1979).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.120 (1979).
96. 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979). But cf. Howard S. v. Friendswood
Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (court ordered a dis-
trict to assume and pay private school tuition which had accrued from the time the
impasse between parent and school district had developed until the court ordered
the district to comply with the statute and plan for the pupil; the monetary order,
however, was properly viewed as an incidental part of equitable relief). In Lough-
ran, equitable issues had become moot. But in another case litigated in the dis-
trict court, equitable issues were not moot and the judge granted plaintiff equitable
relief from expulsion on account of behavior supposedly produced by his handi-
cap. Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978). This Article reasons
against creation of a tort of special education malpractice which might lead to a
money judgment for consequential damages. Left to another forum is the question
of a private cause of action for equitable relief. Suffice it to say that the author
dissents from construction of grant-in-aid statutes to create such rights to equitable
relief. The reader is left to decide how many of the reasons given to oppose avail-
ability of monetary relief apply as well to the issue of availability of equitable
relief to private litigants alleging noncompliance with a condition of a grant-in-aid.
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vised a plan and begun special instruction before trial. The equitable
issues having become moot, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut addressed damages. It noted that the suit was, in ef-
fect, 'a suit for special education malpractice. The judge dismissed the
damages count and concluded that the statute created no private right.
The court offered five principal reasons for its decision. First, it found
that the purpose of the Act and its predecessor statutes was the regulation
of grants-in-aid and not the creation of a private right.9 7 Second, the dis-
trict court found no suggestion in committee reports or other legislative
history that Congress intended such a right9S Third, recognition of such
a claim would conflict with the scheme of the Act.99 Besides conflicting
with administrative procedures, the court found that damages litigation
would contradict those parts of the Act which encourage local planning,
research, and innovation-what the judge called the "catalytic" aspects of
the law.' 00 The court perceived that recognition of such claims would
produce a tendency to make insulation from damages the primary goal
of local planners. The fourth reason for dismissing the damages claim was
tradition.' 0 The court noted that damage actions are usually created by
state legislatures or courts and not by Congress. The fifth reason for not
recognizing the claim was its nonjusticiability. 102 In the judge's opinion,
special education methodology presents a "'myriad of intractable econom-
ic, social, and even philosophical problems.' "103
Current United States Supreme Court interpretations of other statutes
support these conclusions. The trend of Supreme Court decisions in the
last five years demonstrates an unwillingness to infer causes of action
unexpressed by a statute. The recent cases were collected by Justice Stev-
ens in a footnote to his opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago.10 4
In Cannon, Justice Stevens referred to the "recent" policy of the Court as
a "strict approach" against inference of private rights.105 The recent cases
include well-publicized litigations which began before the enactments upon
which the plaintiff in Cannon relied. 106
97. 470 F. Supp. at 113.
98. Id. at 114.




103. Id. (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1972)).
See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
104. 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
105. 441 U.S. at 698.
106. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (no private cause
of action by injured investors implied from § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (no private cause of action under an
election finance reform law); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975) (receiver of failed broker had no cause of action against corpora-
don under Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970 on behalf of damaged cus-
tomers of defunct firm); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (no private cause of action implied under act
designating services Amtrak must provide).
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The exception to the recent decisions is Cannon itself, which the
opinion characterized as "atypical.' 107 Justice Stevens acknowledged that
the courts themselves created a false sense of certainty about issues which
were actually problematic and unusually controversial. That is, the lower
courts in 1972 had created an "impression" among congressmen about the
implication of private rights. 108 The Court reasoned that it should make
a one-time exception to its present policy of nonimplication because the
"legal context" in 1972 at the time of enactment of the statute implicated
in Cannon, bore upon the intent of Congress at that time.109
The opinion stressed that the issue was the intent of Congress in 1972
in enacting the particular Act in question and not the intent at other times
motivating other statutes and, in particular, not the intent of Congress
eight years earlier when the Civil Rights Act of 1964110 passed."' The
Court suggested that the "impression" Congress had of the lower courts'
"legal context" opinions was erroneous and that the lower court cases
upon which Congress relied either did not address issues Congress thought
they settled or settled them on bases different from what Congress sup-
posed."12 But today, when a court ascertains congressional intent in 1972,
even erroneous impressions of the persons whose intent is investigated
are relevant. The Court limited the effect of prior lower court cases con-
struing Civil Rights legislation to this peculiar use of ascertaining later
legislative intent. Two essential rationale of such use of lower court cases
were the great amount of reliance by members of Congress on the lower
court cases and the persistence of lower court assumptions about the im-
plication of private rights."18 But the opinion noted that those assumptions
were challenged after enactment of the Cannon statute."14 Hence, the
supposition is that the reasoning in the Cannon opinion of congressional
reliance on unexamined judicial assumptions will fail for enactments after
1972.
3. Construction of Other Statutes
The trend of recent case law destroys the rationale of congressional
reliance because in visible 1971-1972 federal court litigation, including
cases with agencies of the federal government or federal corporations, ele-
ments of the bar noisily attacked the notion of implied rights. Beginning
in 1974, the United States Supreme Court adopted many of these argu-
ments against implication. Much of this antedated the Rehabilitation
Act,"15 and nearly all of it antedated the Education for All Handicapped
107. 441 U.S. at 717.
108. Id. at 710-11.
109. Id. at 698-99.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976).
111. 441 U.S. at 710-I1.
112. Id. at 696-98.
113. Id. at 696.
114. Id. at 696-98.
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
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Children Act, which passed in late 1975 and did not become fully effec-
tive until September 1, 1978.116 By way of notifying Congress, the bar,
and the public that its acquiescence in uncritical congressional reliance
upon possibly mistaken lower court opinions is now over, the Court noted
that it has never ruled upon the question whether private rights arise
from grant-in-aid statutes with language like that in the statutes now
under discussion. 17
Where congressional silence is not attributable to its confusion about
judicial construction of prior laws, then the Supreme Court will not imply
a private cause of action even in a so-called "civil rights" statute."18 This
suggests the likelihood that the Court will not infer creation of private
causes either in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 1 9 which passed
before unanalyzed judicial assumptions and conflicting judicial interpre-
tations regarding implied private rights were made, or in grant-in-aid
daues passed in 1973 and 1975 after comparable assumptions and inter-
pretations concerning other statutes had come before courts for close ana-
lysis and intense litigation as separate points destined for Supreme Court
adjudication. An express warning to the Congress and the bar occurred in
Cannon, when the Court admonished that express provision for private
causes where intended is the better course and is the indication the Court
will seek.' 2 0 As the concurrence of Justice Rehnquist put it, the Cannon
decision apprised Congress "that the ball, so to speak, may well now be
in its court."' 2 '
The Supreme Court's analysis of these statutes is especially germane
to education. The intent of Congress in each of them is evidence of legis-
lative intent in all. The most reasonable construction of the statutes is
that none of them creates any private cause of action for damages. Con-
gress intended none. All are grant-in-aid statutes which carry conditional
provisions. But these grants and conditions are between the federal govern-
ment and the member states and are no legitimate cause for private suit
by a private party. In a nutshell, these statutes constitute "a matter be-
tween two sovereign powers, and one which private parties cannot bring
into discussion."'122
116. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§
1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976), requires services
or plans for services for handicapped pupils ages 3 to 18 as of September 1, 1978,
and requires a plan to service handicapped pupils ages 3 to 21 beginning September
1, 1980.
117. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702 n.33 (1979).
118. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that the
Indian Civil Rights Act creates no private cause of action).
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976).
120. 441 U.S. at 717.
121. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
122. Mills County v. Railroad Cos., 107 U.S. 557, 566 (1882). See also Downer
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B. Primary Agency Jurisdiction
Enforcement of the federal statutes in question is within the primary
agency jurisdiction of HEW and the various state educational agencies.
For that reason, a court confronted with claims of violation of any of
these statutes should either postpone trial on those counts to obtain the
viewpoint of HEW or dismiss the statutory counts outright.123 The choice
between postponement or dismissal requires the court to consider the
nature of the statutes, the nature of the claim, the competency of agency
action to accomplish statutory goals and provide relief, and the opportun-
ity the plaintiffs have had to participate in agency action. 24
Due process hearings for each and every individual pupil are required
by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, and pupils have a
right to communicate with administrative agencies or complain to them.125
Participation in agency action by amici is permitted under both the Re-
habilitation Act 20 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.127 Far less op-
portunity for agency participation and administrative relief existed in
Gordon v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc. 28 In Gordon, regu-
lations gave plaintiffs only the right to file a complaint and submit writ-
ten data to a state agency. Invoking the doctrine of primary agency juris-
diction and citing Professor Davis, 129 the United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint in which
plaintiffs had asked for a court order that they be provided with free
hospital treatment under the Hill-Burton program administered by HEW.
Other cases to the same effect have arisen in other contexts.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit invoked primary agency jurisdiction to uphold dismissal of the com-
plaint in Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v. Chicago Transit Author-
ity.130 In Bradford, a bus company sued the Chicago Transit Authority
for noncompliance with the Urban Mass Transit Act, alleging direct com-
petitive injury. The only administrative access the company had was a
right to complain to the Urban Mass Transit Administrator, but the ap-
pellate court nonetheless applied the primary agency jurisdiction doctrine.
There are instances, of course, where the primary agency jurisdiction
doctrine does not apply. For example, in Lloyd v. Regional Transporta-
tion Authority,' 3' the trial court invoked the doctrine to dismiss plaintiffs'
action, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that plaintiffs had
no access to the administrative agency enforcing the transportation pro-
123. See generally 3 K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATvE LAW TREATISE § 19.07 (1958).
124. See generally id.
125. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.506 (1979).
126. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1979).
127. 45 C.F.R. §§ 81.21-.23 (1979).
128. 409 F. Supp. 708 (M.D.N.C.), modified, 544 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1976).
129. 409 F. Supp. at 722 n.13 (citing 3 K. DAvis, AnrNTPIsaA=Tv LAW TPrATISE
§ 19.09, at 53 (1958)).
130. 537 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
131. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
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visions of the Rehabilitation Act. The rationale employed by the Lloyd
court, however, does not apply in the context of education. Pupils and
their parents have multiple opportunities to participate in administrative
review and remedial hearings, including HEW processes. Since the com-
petency of HEW to administer federal educational enactments has been
demonstrated, and the issuance of comprehensive regulations in May and
August of 1977182 shows that HEW is about its work, a private suit is un-
necessary to seek general enforcement of educational rights and privileges.
As to individual pupils and special cases, any parent or pupil may seek
an impartial administrative due process hearing on the student's evalua-
tion and program placement as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415,133 and title
45, section 121a.568 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 4
C. Obligations of Recipients Under
the Rehabilitation Act and Education
for All Handicapped Children Act
1. The Rehabilitation Act Obligations
In the first occasion the Supreme Court has had to construe the Re-
habilitation Act,135 it expressly declined to decide the question of whether
the Act creates private choses in action. 30 The Court found it unnecessary
to rule on that issue because it decided for the defendant college on
another issue. The defendant refused to admit a hard-of-hearing girl to a
nursing program because her handicap interfered with receipt of clinical
instruction as then organized. The college refused to modify substantially
its methods of clinical instruction to enable plaintiff to obtain it. The
Court found that the statute does not require affirmative action or sub-
stantial modification of programs to accommodate a person who will not
otherwise be able to participate fully and does not require reduction of
health or other standards of admission for program participation.' 87 In
the view of the Court, the law forbids only exclusion from existing pro-
grams by reason of a condition that does not impair full participation
without program alteration. 8 8
2. The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act Obligations
The obligations of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act' 8 9 are narrower than champions of pupils realize. Nowhere does the
Act prescribe programs. The only requirement of program content in its
132. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-.61, 121a.1-.754 (1979).
133. (1976).
134. (1979).
135. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
136. Id. at 404 n.5.
137. Id. at 408-09.
138. Id. at 410.
139. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 &c Supp. II 1978).
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guidelines is that which makes instruction of handicapped pupils together
with nonhandicapped pupils "to the maximum extent appropriate" a
condition of receipt of grants-in-aid. 140 This is often called the goal of
"mainstreaming." The only other requirement of the law is that a re-
cipient provide the services it has committed itself to provide in an edu-
cational plan developed in a certain way.14' In a real sense, the Act does
not create specific obligations or establish program standards other than
"mainstreaming." Rather, it obliges recipients to plan services in a certain
way and then, but only then, to provide them. The meetings and reviews
the Act contemplates are more planning or rule making than they are ad-
judicatory. The scheme of parental participation is as much in the nature
of guaranteed access to planners as it is a guarantee of due process protec-
tion against school exclusion. Stated differently, the only program obliga-
tions of recipients are to plan in writing after collecting data in a certain
way, to make good efforts to fulfill plans once written, and to "mainstream"
when they can. The implication is that the Act generates only three sub-
stantive rights: first, an expectation of some exposure to normal pupils;
second, a right to expect fair efforts to fulfill written commitments once
made; and third, a right to present suggestions to planners in the nature
of a right to petition the planners. This last right is similar to the right
to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.
A plaintiff will not be able to allege substantial breach of any of
these three obligations where his parents have participated in planning
meetings, especially if they have employed lawyers or consultants to assist
in the planning process. The opportunities to allege and prove insincerity
or total want of effort to fulfill written plans will be few. In most instances,
a plaintiff will want to allege that the plan drawn for him does not suit
him. But that allegation is not actionable. While the statute assures a
parent access to a state planning agency, it guarantees no one, neither HEW,
the United States (the grantor of grants-in-aid), nor any pupil that the
plan will fulfill any substantive standard except attention to "mainstream-
ing" in appropriate cases. Therefore, the only duty of public schools is to
plan ahead somewhat. Having fulfilled that duty, no entity or individual
is entitled to take anything from the schools as relief-not the sovereign
grantor United States, not HEW, and not a pupil plaintiff.
V. EDUCATION AND SCHOOL ARTICLEs IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Common School Articles
Common school clauses in state constitutions were usually drafted when
the governmental conception of public schools was strong and explicit,
so they are unlikely sources of private rights to sue.' 42 Indeed, as to handi-
capped pupils, such clauses may even damage arguments advanced for a
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976).
142. See cases cited notes 22-24 supra.
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private claim at common law because there is the suggestion that the
special education of handicapped persons is not "common schooling" in
the sense intended by such clauses.143
B. Education Articles
A goal of more recently drafted articles is the education of all chil-
dren. But such language is deemed hortatory only,144 so that by itself,
without legislation, the language may be construed not to require special
education services by the state or any district.145 In any event, where con-
stitutional language is determined to be a mandate rather than a mere ex-
hortation, the mandate operates only as a command by the state to a subdi-
vision, and not as the generator of a private right. This is the gist of the rul-
ing in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.146 The state school
law authorities recognize the governmental nature of schools and insulate
them from malpractice suits. But does this governmental character afford a
handicapped pupil a different cluster of rights to recover for ineffective
instruction?
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION GuARr.s
A. Federal Guarantees
In Keyes v. School District No. One,'47 the trial court rejected the
argument that want of affirmative action to correct de facto segregation
violates constitutional guarantees,148 but nevertheless ordered correction
of the racial imbalance in schools not affected by any de jure segregation
because those schools (the de facto segregated schools) produced educa-
tional achievement unequal to achievement of other schools in the dis-
trict. 49 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit rejected this finding. 50 The United States Supreme Court did
not review this aspect of the case.1 51 The Supreme Court, however, later
did hear a number of such arguments for construction of the Constitution
to afford a right of equal educational opportunity distinct from the right
not to be instructed in a de jure dual school system. The Supreme Court
has steadfastly rejected the arguments.
143. See Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 212-13, 154 N.E.2d
265, 270 (1958).
144. See, e.g., Blase v. State, 55 Ii. 2d 94, 99, 802 N.E.2d 46, 49 (1973). A
court might also seize upon the rule of construction which favors harmonizing new
provisions with antecedent provisions on the same subject. 16 Am. JUR. 2d Con-
stitutional Law § 102 (1979).
145. See, e.g., Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 92, 370 N.E.2d 535, 536(1977). See generally 16 Am. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 139-149 (1979).
146. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
147.' 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d
990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
148. Id. at 76-77.
149. Id. at 83.
150. 445 F.2d 990, 1004 (10th Cir. 1971), modified, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
151. 413 U.S. 189, 195, 198 (1973).
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In Mclnnis v. Shapiro,152 a three-judge court rejected the argument
that the Constitution guarantees equal school inputs, expenditures, or
resources for the pupils in a state. It reviewed the school equal protection
cases and found them to be based on de jure racial policies. It found in
school inputs or resource allocation no classification requiring constitu-
tional scrutiny. The evidence showed that Illinois aided local school dis-
tricts with flat grants per pupil and equalization grants which assured
every district resources of at least $400 a year per pupil. Per pupil expendi-
tures varied among districts from $400 a year to in excess of $1,000 a year.
Local sources were ad valorem property taxes. Assessed values varied wide-
ly. Poor districts could raise little revenue, while rich districts had less
difficulty. Ironically, districts with the lowest resources per pupil had the
highest tax rates, whereas school districts with large resources had rela-
tively low tax rates. The court found local choice in selection of local
services, local taxes, and expenditures an adequate justification for the
statutory system.153 The court found expressly that the United States
Constitution does not require a state to allocate resources in proportion
to need.15 4 It also reasoned that ascertainment of need and of appropriate
allocations were nonjusticiable.155 The United States Supreme Court sum-
marily affirmed the decision.1 56 Claims of a federal constitutional right
to equal educational resources also fell in Burruss v. Wilkerson.157 The Su-
preme Court of the United States again affirmed summarily.158
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 the
United States Supreme Court expressly found that education is not a right
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and that when a
state chooses to provide for public schools it may create or tolerate large
differences in programs and resources among schools and pupils on non-
racial bases, and that such disparities in treatment will not be strictly
reviewed or treated as suspect but can be justified by meeting only a
"reasonableness" standard.' 6 0 Local experimentation and choice in tax
rates and service levels were, as a matter of law, adequate justifications of
reasonableness absent proof showing inadequacy of the minimum program
the disparities might cause. The line defining the scope of equal protection
in school cases is minimal reasonableness, except for racial classifications.
The Supreme Court has never rested its equal protection judgment in
any school case on a concept of equal resources. So far as the author can
find, the Court has never again even used phrases like "equal education"
152. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd per curiam sub nom. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
153. Id. at 331-34.
154. Id. at 331-32.
155. Id. at 335-37.
156. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam).
157. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
158. 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (per curiam).
159. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
160. Id. at 29-37.
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or "equal educational opportunity" since its famous 1954 dictum in Brown
v. Board of Education,161 except to summarize arguments of counsel or
lower court dicta it refused to accept or endorse. Indeed, in the celebrated
case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,1 62 the Court
went out of its way to note that Brown and its progeny are solely concerned
with elimination of de jure dual schools, and are not to be read or cited
as authority for the "myriad factors of human existence which can cause
discrimination in a multitude of ways."'163 The Swann Court stated that
the specific scourge of separation of the races "was what Brown was all
about," not educational achievement. 6 4 Given this posture of the Court,
it is not surprising that the Supreme Court applied its precedent in San
Antonio v. Rodriguez to the special education context in the case of Kruse
v. Campbell, 65 where the trial court's decision commanding enrollment
of a handicapped plaintiff based on the equal protection clause was re-
versed and remanded.
B. State Guarantees
Not all state constitutions contain guarantees of equal protection of
the law, but where they do, standards for review of state action under the
state clause will either be similar to standards used to apply the federal
equal protection clause, or less strict so as to afford fewer grounds for
citizens to challenge classifications.' 66 One recent state court opinion
ruled that an allegation of arbitrary discrepancies is not sufficient to in-
voke the state equal protection clause.' 67 Another case held that discrimi-
nation must be both purposeful and invidious to fall under the prohibition
of the state clause.' 68
Decisions in states without an equal protection clause sometimes read
an equal protection component into due process and other terms of the
state constitution. But the component is likely to be a smaller device than
the federal equal protection engine. For example, the Illinois Supreme
Court declared that the judicial and constitutional limits on unequal public
treatment would go no further than to prohibit the worst sort of invidious
161. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
162. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
163. Id. at 22.
164. Id. at 6.
165. 434 U.S. 808 (1977). The Supreme Court decision in Kruse appears to
undercut three previous lower court decisions: McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430
F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
166. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321,
43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965); Fox v. Rosewell, 55 Ill. App. 3d 860, 371 N.E.2d 287
(1977).
167. Contemporary Music Group, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 57 Ill. App. 3d
182, 372 N.E.2d 982 (1978).
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class legislation. 1609 All in all, it is safe to predict that the state reviewing
courts will not recognize violations of state equal protection guarantees
in circumstances where federal precedents recognize no violation of the
fourteenth amendment.170
VII. GuARAT s oF DuE PRocEss oF LAw
A. Federal Guarantees
Were a handicapped plaintiff to allege poor instruction as a denial
of due process of law, then the short answer to the allegation would be
that the fourteenth amendment does not by itself create any substantive
entitlement,17' but only guarantees procedural protection of substantive
property or liberty rights created by other sources. For that reason, the
failure of a plaintiff to allege a substantive federal right to better educa-
tional services or instruction implies a failure to state a constitutional claim
of violation of due process guarantees under the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has expressed this in an educational context in Board
of Regents v. Roth:172 "[P]roperty interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law .... " 173 The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
169. Doolin v. Korshak, 39 Ill. 2d 521, 286 N.E.2d 897 (1968).
170. See, e.g., People v. Francis, 40 Ill. 2d 204, 239 N.E.2d 129 (1968) (Illinois
Supreme Court expressed opinion that equality doctrines are not violated when
the state legislature and dispensing agencies award differing amounts of money
and facilities to various junior colleges; proper for General Assembly to delegate
discretion in the matter with only general guidelines).
171. When state law has provided for a right to attend common schools, then
that right in turn is protected by the fourteenth amendment. Lower federal courts
have occasionally invoked the due process clause to justify granting relief to parties
alleging expulsion or exclusion of handicapped persons from school without good
cause, hearings, or alternative procedures to ascertain good cause. A smaller number
of cases have granted relief from program changes or school reassignments which
were so major that they could constitute partial expulsion or exclusion. See Note,
Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1105 (1979).
The fourteenth amendment may be a source of protection against govern-
mental action which is so damaging as to constitute deprivation of a liberty in-
terest to seek employment or a means to live. It is difficult to envision how a
public school placement program could so violate a protected liberty interest. To
avoid a demurrer, a plaintiff seeking to allege deprivation of his liberty interest
without due process of law on account of a special placement program would have
to plead an untrue, derogatory publication by defendants about plaintiff which
seriously stigmatized him in the community, coupled with an expulsion or exclusion
comparable to a discharge of an employee. These are the necessary elements of such
a fourteenth amendment liberty interest claim. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624(1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 960 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court cases have vitiated the lower court decisions
which found the unintended stigmatization from inaccurate assessment or place-
ment to be an actionable constitutional violation.
172. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
178. Id. at 577.
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in Perry v. Sindermann.174 Applying this doctrine are two recent decisions
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The first is Webster v. Redmond.175 The opinion indicates that the
fourteenth amendment confers no substantive right, and accordingly, guar-
antees no right to a hearing where other constitutional provisions or statutes
do not independently create an express substantive entitlement protected
by the due process clause. 1' Yet more recent is the case of Palmer v. Board
of Education,177 where the court commented, "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not create a protected interest .... "178 Thus before that amend-
ment operates there must be an "independent source" of entitlement which
is worthy of denomination as a protected property or liberty interest.
Moreover, even where an arguable substantive right exists, failure to
afford a procedure to ascertain it does not in itself constitute a cause of
action for monetary damages, absent pleading and proof of actual indi-
vidual loss proximately caused by violation of or trespass upon the under-
lying substantive property or liberty right.'7 9 Carey v. Piphus s ° teaches
that failure to afford due process is not generally compensable without
proof that the outcome of the proceedings affording due process would
have secured for plaintiff a real benefit in property or liberty rights which
was lost for lack of due process.' 8 '
Nor should one presume that bureaucratic methods for procuring
teachers and resources, and then allocating them among programs and
classes of pupils, including handicapped pupils, could not withstand due
process scrutiny. In such an inquiry, expert consultation is an adequate
procedure and an adversarial hearing is not required.' 8 2 The general
teaching of Mathews v. Eldridge18 3 is that the flexible balancing of inter-
ests, which is the essence of the application of the due process clause, will
not typically require an adversary hearing. More specifically, the case holds
that where the entitlement implicated in a case is one of a class of rights,
the determination of the existence of which usually requires expert in-
ference and does not usually require ascertainment of the credibility of
testimony about concrete occurrences, then an adversary hearing is not
required in any particular case fairly placed within that class. Anxious
mothers and beleaguered teachers sometimes quarrel about a pupil and
in later meetings dispute who said what during the spat. But such inci-
dentals are rarely relevant and never critical. In a few words, public school
personnel and resource management fulfill the Mathews requirements even
174. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
175. 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039 (1980).
176. Id. at 796-97.
177. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
178. Id. at 1274.
179. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 259-61.
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though they do not satisfy all citizens. Furthermore, the more formal ad-
ministrative methods now available, under federal regulations, to contest
the adequacy of resources allocated to a class or a child are procedures
which provide protection far exceeding the prophylaxis the due process
clause obligates.' 8 4
B. State Guarantees
While the doctrine of substantive due process may linger in the law
some places, the author has been unable to find any jurisdiction which
has suggested that it may ground a claim for defective teaching of pupils.
Rarely will a state due process clause give a pupil or his parents more rights
than those the federal clause gives. 185
VIII. CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
A. Procedural Character
The 1871 Civil Rights Act' 8 6 literally creates a civil cause of action for
violation of substantive rights contained in federal statutes, treaties, and
substantive constitutional articles. It does not create new federal obligations
or federal rights, but makes invasions of a federal right by officials acting
under color of state law actionable in state and federal courts. The Act
expands remedies but does not create new substantive entitlements. 87
It follows that the nonexistence of other federal claims for damages
by a handicapped person for failure or ineffectiveness of instruction de-
stroys his claim for damages under section 1983.188 The purpose of section
1983 was to supplement remedies or remove state law bars to remedies, 8 9
not to produce new property or liberty rights. Nor will the existence of
state-law based substantive rights trigger section 1983. State-law created
substantive rights are not made actionable by section 1983.190 In particular,
persons hurt by the negligence of professionals employed by the state may
not sue the professionals under section 1983.191
As recently as May 1979, the United States Supreme Court, in Chap-
man v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,192 again advised that the
right to sue under section 1983 is derivative and conditional, i.e., adjective
or procedural only. In Chapman, the Court found that the federal district
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases seeking to invalidate state
184. See Note, supra note 171, at 1105.
185. See Lavin v. Board of Educ., 22 IMI. App. 3d 555, 317 N.E.2d 717 (1974);
16 Ais. Jum. 2d Constitutional Law § 811 (1979). See also 20 AM. Jim. 2d Courts
§225 (1965).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
187. C. ANTIEAU, supra note 78, § 43; 15 Ai. Ju. 2d Civil Rights § 19 (1976).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
189. 15 Am. Jum. 2d Civil Rights § 16 (1976).
190. C. ANrTiAu, supra note 78, § 80; 15 Am. Jim. 2d Civil Rights § 19 (1976).
191. See, e.g., Fisher v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1973). But see Comment,
Damages Actions for Denial of Equal Educational Opportunities, 45 Mo. L. REV.
281 ). (1980).92. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
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welfare regulations because of conflict between them and the Federal So-
cial Security Act.193 The plaintiffs invoked the subject matter jurisdictional
grants in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4),194 which gives courts the power to de-
cide allegations of violations of rights created by the Constitution or by
statutes establishing civil rights and equal rights. The plaintiffs, however,
did not invoke general federal question jurisdiction, perhaps because they
were not prepared to allege and prove individual amounts in controversy
of sufficient size.195 Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that the supremacy clause
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983196 were provenances of underlying rights in them-
selves. The Supreme Court found that the supremacy clause generates no
conditions, benefits, privileges, or federal rights which would not inde-
pendently be expected absent the clause, but rather protects rights emanat-
ing from other sources by creating a procedural rule for state courts. 97 The
Court also found that the Social Security Act produces substantive rights
but that they are not "civil rights." Consequently, ascertainment of vio-
lations of the Act is not within the civil rights subject matter jurisdiction
of district courts, as opposed to general federal question jurisdiction which
the plaintiffs declined to plead.'9 8
The assertion by the plaintiffs of subject matter jurisdiction based
on section 1983 as a source of rights was thoroughly rejected by the Court.
The Court rejected the assertion because section 1983 does "not provide
for any substantive rights-equal or otherwise." 99 The Supreme Court
noted the procedural character of section 1983 and that "one cannot go
into court and claim a 'violation of s. 1983' for s. 1983 by itself does not
protect anyone against anything." Both by "its terms as well as its history,
it does not provide any rights at all.1200 The opinion quotes an assurance
of Senator Edmunds, a proponent of the statute, that it "'only gives a
remedy,'" and that any suit praying its remedies will "'not [be] based
upon it,' "201 but upon other laws granting rights or entitlements to citizens
which exist outside the events which happen in courthouses. This legisla-
tive history was essential to the final ruling in Chapman; the Court found
want of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts and dismissed the
suits.
B. Entity Liability and Elements
The plaintiff must prove the usual elements of tort litigation in a
section 1983 count: duty, breach, fault, damages, causation, and fore-
seeability.2 02 The duty must be a reasonably well defined one and the
193. Id. at 606.
194. (1976).
195. 441 U.S. at 606.
196. (1976).
197. 441 U.S. at 612-13.
198. Id. at 620-23.
199. Id. at 617.
200. Id. at 618.
201. Id. at 617-18 (footnote omitted).
202. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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breach must be an act or policy of the defendant itself; there is no room for
respondeat superior in section 1983 cases.203
Thus, the plaintiff in a section 1983 case must allege involvement by
the defendant in the misfeasance. Moreover, he must allege a higher degree
of culpability than that usually found in professional malpractice cases.
Allegation of a mere failure to act, even if negligent, is insufficient to sus-
tain a "1983" complaint against demurrer.204 Culpability greater than
simple negligence usually must be pleaded.205 The cases announcing a
simple negligence standard of fault are almost all cases of physical harm
done to a prisoner or detained person.206 Besides pleading damages and
cause in fact, the plaintiff in a section 1983 case must plead proximity of
causation of his loss of entitlement.2 07
Typically, the school record of a problem pupil reveals a multiplicity
of causes of failure, and the unforeseeability of results of educational
method selections and teacher efforts. This suggests the impossibility of
ascertaining the parts of school failure attributable to methods of teach-
ing, teaching personnel, the home, the impairment or handicap, and the
free will of the pupil himself. All the reasons which dictate that the com-
mon law should not recognize a tort of educational malpractice apply with
equal weight to section 1983 actions. State and federal courts should not
construe section 1983, even if it were more than a procedural provision,
as authorizing any such claim.
C. Immunities Applicable to Federal
Claims: Legislation and Good Faith
Two defenses often should prevent recovery against school boards,
school board members, and high officials in would-be malpractice cases.
The first is legislative immunity, and the second is good faith immunity.
The two often converge. When a plaintiff attacks a "program" or "system"
as opposed to individual classroom teachers, then in effect he attacks policy
making. Activity of that sort, however, is immune from challenge in a
section 1983 case, unless the plaintiff pleads mala fides to overcome the leg-
islative immunity.208 The scope of immunity varies proportionately with
the degree of discretion or judgment the challenged decisions possess.209
Research uncovers no case in which any court has limited the degree of
discretion or judgment of local boards in planning curricula and methods
for a school system, or in recruiting and assigning special education teach-
ers. One may argue that there exist few public planning functions which
involve more judgment. Such planning is legislative in essence and should
203. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
204. See McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1978); 15 Am. JuR. 2d Civil Rights § 20, at 319 n.5 (1976).
205. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
206. C. ANTIEAu, supra note 78, § 87.
207. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
208. C. ArxrAu, supra note 78, §§ 41-42.
209. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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be immune from challenges, except under a plea of specific intent to dam-
age a plaintiff.
Defendant school boards will also claim a good faith immunity and
innocent unawareness of claims made by a plaintiff. This is a second doc-
trine of immunity which operates in public education, and even operates
in matters where the transaction challenged is not legislative in nature
but is action specific to one pupil. The doctrine was fully articulated in
the United States Supreme Court decision in Wood v. Strickland.210 That
case held that school boards and their members are immune from money
damage suits, unless the plaintiffs prove either specific intent to harm the
pupil or actual knowledge by defendants that their act was illegal, or that
the action was so obviously illegal that the defendants must have known
it was illegal. Specific intent is rarely present in malpractice and would
be difficult to prove. The very novelty and controversy of all branches of
special education demonstrate that the rights, if any, of pupils who fail
are so unclear that defendants will rarely know that any program of theirs
violates a right of some pupil. The principles in Wood which immunize
a school board should also immunize high level officials such as a super-
intendent of schools.
IX. DEraNsEs GENERALLY
Some special precepts of fairness also weigh against special education
malpractice claims: consent, contributory misconduct, statutes of limita-
tions, and state law immunities applicable to state law claims.
A. Consent
Consent is a well-known defense. It operates most visibly in such torts
as conversion, nuisance, battery, and trespassory torts generally. But the
defense is also raised in trespass on the case or negligence, where it lodges
in the doctrine of assumption of risk. Additionally, it is a principle which
operates in equity jurisprudence. Altogether it pervades civil law. It is
sometimes expressed in the broad maxim, volenti non fit injuria. Consent
should be a defense to most claims of special education malpractice.
A young child is not in a position to consent, but his parent is, and
the consent of the parent should be imputed to the child in special edu-
cation contexts. Imputation of consent of parent to his child is not un-
heard of in damages cases based on federal constitutional law.21 1 Nor is
it strange to the law of negligence, which occasionally charges negligence
of parent to child.21 2 Contributory negligence is conceptually distinct
from consent or assumption of the risk in the strict sense, but the two
doctrines often converge in particular cases2 13 and imputation of one should
210. 420 U.S. 808 (1975).
211. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
212. 58 Am. JuR. 2d Negligence §§ 469-472 (1971).
213. 57 Am. JuR. 2d Negligence § 278 (1971).
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be authority for imputation of the other in certain types of litigation.
Imputation is proper in educational contexts because there usually exists
a practical identity of interest between parent and child in school matters,
and parents typically advocate the interests of children vigorously. In the
matter of consent to program placement, a parent is a sort of proxy or
attorney-in-fact if not a veritable alter ego of the pupil who is his or her
child.
B. Contributory Misconduct
Just as the law recognizes that a child can commit contributory negli-
gence and crime, so, in a suit for alleged special education misfeasance or
even nonfeasance, courts should recognize that pupils are responsible for
their development in large measure. Courts should apply a doctrine which
denies relief to one who has himself misbehaved and approaches the court
often having wasted part of his youth or infancy.
C. Statutes of Limitations
Because limitations law is local law, one cannot do more than identify
issues which may arise. A threshold matter is the question when the statute
begins to run. The age of majority is local law also, and majority for one
purpose may not be majority for another. A related question is whether
an educational handicap constitutes an incapacity which suspends the
running of a statute. This question is important because the handicap may
persist after the age of majority. Finally, there is the question how much
time must pass to bar a claim for damages for inadequate special education
or instruction, i.e., what clause of the statute governs?
The objects barred by some clauses (harms barring clauses) are dam-
ages or harms, while the objects barred by other clauses (fault bars) are
wrongs or invasions. Some clauses speak of harm done and define bars with
reference to the plaintiff and his loss (e.g., personal actions and property
damage), while others speak not of the harm to plaintiff but of the fault
of the defendant and define bars in terms of the trespass, breach, or delict
of the defendant. To use classical forms, the one clause identifies some
damnum while the other specifies some injuria. Clauses barring "negli-
gence" or "malpractice" are examples of fault barring clauses as is a
clause barring a claim "based on a statute" which creates a substantive
right, while a clause barring a claim for bodily harm would be an example
of a harm barring clause.
But what is the fault (injuria) of educational malpractice and what
is the harm (damnum)? In terms of injuria, the plaintiffs typically allege
negligence and noncompliance with statutes. Clauses barring relief for
the consequences of such faults will generally operate to bar such claims.
But a clause barring professional malpractice claims should not apply to
teachers because, whether or not teachers may claim the status of profes-
sionals, it is unlikely that legislators drafting and enacting such clauses
contemplated teachers as professionals for purposes of special clauses in
the statutes of limitations.
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Regarding the damnum, what is the nature of ignorance? Is it time
lost equal to the time when the plaintiff might have learned? Or can one
say it is interrupted human development? One component of the loss is
diminished earning capacity. Others would be isolation and inability to
appreciate certain aesthetic pleasures. On balance, all of these are personal
harms and are not the sorts of harms legislators contemplate when enacting
dauses to bar claims concerning property or a contract. The bonum of
development sufficient to permit "mainstreaming," manifested by the
federal and state special education laws, likewise is personal, so that the
damnum of failure of such development is personal also. By the same
token, the harm of a denial of equal protection, which includes indignity
and isolation, is personal. Similarly, the good secured by guarantees of due
process is partly dignitory, and consequently should be subject to personal
harm barring clauses, even when the underlying entitlement is "property"
for purposes of substantive constitutional law.
When the claim is based on federal substantive law, one first must
ascertain the interest that Congress or the ratifying member states sought
to protect, and the correlative harm to be proscribed. This is a federal law
question. But then one must classify the harm so identified in the scheme
of the state statute of limitations, deciding if the federally defined and
proscribed harm approaches some class of harm given in the dames of
the state statute. The latter question is one of state law. Put briefly, one
applies harm bars by using state categories to determine time limits for a
suit implicating federal interests and correlative harms. But the same two-
stage process of construction must occur also with fault barring clauses.
First, one limns the federal obligation and converse deviating breach by
construing federal law. Second, one compares the fault so delineated with
the categories enacted in the state law to determine which state delict or
other violation of right is closest to the fault defined by federal law, and
hence, which clause of the statute of limitations applies. This two-stage
process is unavoidable. The reason is that Congress has adopted state
statutes and their state court interpretations as federal law for lawsuits
based on federal statutes or constitutional provisions which do not them-
selves provide a limitations period.21 4
This adoption of state adjective law to accompany federal substantive
law has caused some confusion. All the commentators agree, however, that
where the federal character of the claim the plaintiff makes and its action-
ability under federal substantive law are so dear that resolution of the
affirmative defense of limitations requires the court to ascertain the intent
not of Congress but rather of the state legislature, then the state decisions
control and are the binding rules of decision even in federal courts as to
federal claims.21 5 Absent an adoption statute or federal limitations statute,
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
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federal courts have been inclined to adopt state limitations. A prior con-
gressional adoption statute had incorporated state laws only for "actions
at law," but the federal courts followed the practice of limiting equitable
federal claims not only by the doctrine of laches but by applying state limi-
tations statutes. 210 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has directed
the federal courts to follow state court interpretations of state limitations
acts even if to do so requires federal courts to overrule prior federal pre-
cedents. In Bausermar v. Blunt,217 the Court held that a later construction
by the state court would be followed in federal courts even though federal
courts had earlier construed the state statute of limitations contrary to the
subsequent state court opinion. In effect, Congress has, with full judicial
cooperation, inserted state limitations provisions into federal statutes and
constitutional clauses, and into the procedural and remedial statutes im-
plementing them. In particular, Congress made the state limitations statutes,
as construed by state courts, a part 218 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.219
D. State Law Immunities from State Law Claims
Because state educational systems are implemented by local subdivi-
sions which still raise most of their revenue locally, the eleventh amend-
ment will not prevent suits in federal court against local districts seeking
money damages for special education malpractice.220 But state law may
prevent suits in state court by creating state law immunities. Elements of
both parental and governmental immunity from damages suits operate in
school settings. Even where a state has abolished general sovereign im-
munity, it may by statute or decision have provided for a parental or
other qualified immunity for local subdivisions and government servants
in many instances. Examples of other qualified immunities are immunity
from suit on account of acts constituting policy making, acts done while
relying on laws or regulations, immunity of superiors from liability for acts
of subordinates, and immunity from suit for failure to enforce laws. 221
Most prominent in schools is parental immunity.
The parental immunity, although not express, is often readily implied
from statutes or cases clothing teachers with the status in loco parentis for
216. See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 724 (1946).
217. 147 U.S. 647 (1893).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
220. See Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1975).
221. See, e.g., exceptions to Federal Tort Claims Act, listed in 28 U.S.C. §
2680 (1976). A representative state statute is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-201 to -212
dSmith-Hurd 1966), which clearly preserves immunity for state officials when per-
forming certain functions and in specific crcumstances. See also 3 K. DAvis, supra
note 128, § 25.18. Davis argues that an agency's immunity should extend to officers
of that agency because the costs of the government enterprise should not be borne
by nonmalicious servants. Id. § 26.02. Davis believes that the courts should vigi-
lantly protect immunity of officers from suit for nonmalicous torts by readily
granting summary judgment in cases where plaintiff alleges malice but has smallchance of proving it. id. § 26.04.
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many purposes.222 The realistic role of teachers is less like that of profes-
sionals and more like that of mothers (or perhaps aunts), so that a quali-
fied parental or familial immunity of teachers from suit for poor tutelage
is realistic.
It goes without saying, however, that state law immunities, as opposed
to the federal immunities judically fashioned in Wood v. Strickland,2 23
bar only claims a plaintiff seeks to ground on state law.
X. COMmON GOOD AND INDIVIDUAL DIGNrrY
The principles of jurisprudence, including respect for the separation
of powers, honest intention to find legislative intent, and recognition of
judicial competence and incompetence are adequate reasons not to create
a new tort. But they generally are not adequate reasons to judge unequal
exposure of pupils to different instructional abilities in teachers as good
and just. Even in one school district, the distribution of instructional talent
among classrooms is uneven. For the countervailing reasons given in this
Article, one may legitimately decline to create a tort to correct the inequality
and still denounce the unequal distribution of teacher talent among pupils
and classrooms. In other words, limiting courts to their proper function
is itself a good which competes with distributive justice in a school dis-
trict, and should lead us to forbid creation in that district of a compensa-
tory tort. Still, it is natural to ask a more transcendent question: will re-
fusal to compensate some pupils for unequal exposure to bad teachers be
ethically right, assuming dear proof, agreed standards, and a legitimate
tribunal available to take the evidence and apply the standards? To ex-
plore this question, the author will postulate a hypothetical initial con-
dition of the type Professor Rawls has made famous.22 4
Assume that there exists a jurisdiction with a parliamentary repre-
sentative government. Its education minister reports to parliament. There
are no written constitutions and no guarantees of due process, equal pro-
tection, free education, common schools, etc. In fact, the jurisdiction op-
erates one system of public schools and does not allow private schools.
In this hypothetical jurisdiction there is nothing like a local school district.
Parliament and its minister control schools directly. Assume further that
parliament has written and implemented a twenty-one year budget which
222. Their status in loco parentis constitutes for teachers a limited defense ofjustification to what would otherwise be torts of battery or false imprisonment in
school discipline. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); 68 Am. JuR. 2d Schools
§§ 256-259 (1973). The doctrine also immunizes teachers and their employing dis-
tricts from ordinary negligence suits for bodily injury to pupils. Thomas v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 60 Ill. App. 3d 729, 377 N.E.2d 55 (1978); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 489(1962). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 123, § 25.04.
223. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
224. J. RAwrs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE (1971). Rawls proposes a neo-Kantian
ethical technique to evaluate competing rules of conduct, especially rules of dis-
tributive justice, in which each of us is hypothetically ignorant of his or her status,
ability, and the personal consequences of any one rule. The hypothetical posited
here is not so elementary a situation as Rawls requires for his analysis.
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fixes expenditures on education at a given amount each year and that pupil
population does not change from year to year. That is, the overall educa-
tional budget and per pupil expenditures are limited and do not vary from
year to year. The specific content, however, provided in the educational
system is variable as long as the total budget is not exceeded. One variable
the parliament is considering is whether to use some of the educational
budget to compensate or relieve pupils who have had the misfortune to
be instructed by more than their share of ignorant or uncaring instructors.
Any such relief must come from the set budget and will reduce resources
available for other pupils. Assume further in this hypothetical republic
that there exists a consensus about what traits, acts, and practices of in-
structors promote the goals of the educational system and which do not.
In short, the teaching methods which are sound and those which are not
have been agreed upon. For these purposes one should also assume that
the education minister and parliament are aware that many incompetent
teachers are employed and that they are doing their best to eliminate them.
But they are concerned about what to do with pupils who, in the mean-
time, encounter more than their share of these incompetent teachers not
yet removed.
To make the hypothetical complete one should also assume that the
records of pupils and of teachers are full, complete, detailed, and trust-
worthy. Additionally, the sciences of pediatrics, pedagogy, psychology, and
educational measurement are advanced and the courts in this jurisdiction
have convenient access to all records and to excellent expert consultation
in the advanced fields of science. Stated differently, one may assume that,
in this imaginary jurisdiction, standards and causation are justiciable.
Parliament is interested in practical questions, but also in the ethical
question whether some of the educational budget should be diverted from
services directed to the majority of pupils in order to compensate the mi-
nority of pupils who will have the misfortune to spend more than their
share of time in classes taught by ignorant teachers. Consider an assembly
of citizens each of whom expects to become a parent or grandparent during
the next twenty-one years. Each citizen, so assembled, faces the risk
that his or her child or grandchild will be one of the few who gets
"stuck" for more than his or her share of semesters in the classes taught by
worthless instructors whom the minister has not yet weeded out. Given the
opportunity, would a majority of such citizens vote for or against creation of
a tort of educational malpractice?
The author supposes that a vast majority of such persons would vote
"no" and reject such a tort. Some would give a utilitarian rationale: dif-
ferences in morale and innovation, the nondiversion of resources, and the
maintenance of authority associated with rejection of the tort will so far
advance the well-being of most pupils that those differences more than
compensate for the harm that the unlucky pupils will experience. But this
author also supposes that a large number of persons would give as their
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sincere reason for rejecting the tort the neo-Kantian rationale for toleration
of unequal results, namely, benefit to the least advantaged persons. 22 5 In
other words, the order, creativity, morale, and preserved resources of a
school system immune from suit will likely produce a better learning ex-
perience for all students, even for the boy or girl subjected during thirteen-
plus years to a disproportionate amount of bad instruction, than would
thirteen years in a vulnerable system which tries to equalize the discrepancy
between pupils who have suffered only a proportionate share of bad teach-
ers and those who have suffered a disproportionate amount. Immunity is
calculated a priori to make every pupil better off than he or she would be
under a regime which acknowledges a tort of public school educational
malpractice. If this be true, then one may conclude with the categorical
statement that the unanimous rejection of the tort by courts reflects durable
wisdom and fundamental justice.
225. The term "least advantaged persons" refers not to handicapped persons,
but rather to persons who have, by chance or otherwise, spent the most time in
classes managed by the least able teachers. The hypothetical is readily adjusted
for special education by speaking of the subset of faculty who are special educa-
tion teachers, and the subset of parents whose offspring will be at risk, and who
know that risk but nothing else special about their offspring. For the case of
special education, the budgetary and related assumptions should be altered to
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